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Abstract 
Many countries over the last decade, have used performance-based contracting (PBC) to manage and maintain roads. The 
implementation of PBC provides additional benefits for the government/public such as cost savings and improved conditions of 
contracted road assets. In Australia, PBC is already being implemented on all categories of roads: national, state, urban and rural. 
Australian PBC arrangement is designed to turn over control and responsibility for roadway system maintenance, rehabilitation, 
and capital improvement projects to private contractors. Contractors’ responsibilities include determination of treatment types, the 
design, programming and the undertaking of works needed to maintain road networks at predetermined performance levels. 
Indonesia initiated two PBC pilot projects in 2011, the Pantura Section Demak-Trengguli (7.68 kilometers) in Central Java Province 
and Section Ciasem-Pamanukan (18.5 kilometers) in West Java Province. Both sections are categorized as national roads. The 
contract duration for both of these projects is four years. To facilitate a possible way forward, it is proposed to conduct a study to 
understand Australia’s experiences of advancing from pilot projects to nation-wide programs using PBC. The study focuses on the 
scope of contracts, bidding processes, risk allocation, and key drivers, using relevant PBC case studies from Australia. 
Recommendations for future PBC deployment nation-wide should be based on more research associated with risk allocation. This 
will include investigation of standard conditions of contract. Implications of the contract clauses for the risk management strategy 
to be adopted by contractors. Based on the nature of risks, some are best managed by the project owner. It is very important that 
all parties involved to be open to the new rules of contract and to convince themselves about the potential increased benefits of the 
use of PBC. The most recent states of challenging issues were explored and described. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Potential Benefits of Implementing PBC for Roads 
A performance-based contract (PBC) differs significantly from a method-based contract that has been traditionally 
used to maintain roads. In PBC, payments for the management and maintenance of road assets are explicitly linked to 
the contractor successfully meeting or exceeding certain clearly defined minimum performance indicators. While 
traditionally, the road agency as a client normally specifies techniques, technologies, materials and quantities of 
materials to be used, together with the time period during which the maintenance works should be executed. The 
payment to the contractor is based on the amount of inputs (e.g., cubic meters of asphalt concrete, number of working 
hours, etc.). 
The client specifies performance indicators that the contractor is required to meet when delivering maintenance 
services. Performance is calculated based on several level of services defined through road users perspective, which 
may include but not limited to, vehicle velocity, rider comfort, and safety. For example, the contractor is not paid for 
the number of potholes he has patched, but for the output of his work: no pothole remaining open (or 100% patched). 
There are penalties in case of failure to comply with the performance indicators or failure in executing timely actions.  
Otherwise, the payment can be regularly made, usually in equal monthly installments. PBC for roads can be "hybrid," 
i.e., combines features of both method- and performance-based contracts [1]. With contractor’s initiative in setting 
out their own work methods, an increase in the efficiency of public funds usage is to be expected and also to encourage 
technological innovation in the construction industry. 
Studies by The World Bank suggest that road agencies adopting PBC approach have claimed the following 
achievements: i) cost savings from 10% up to 40%; ii). expenditure certainty, iii). reduction of the in-house workforce, 
iv). improved conditions of contracted road assets and reduction of roads in poor condition, v). greater road user 
satisfaction, and vi). multi-year financing of a maintenance program.  
Realizing these potential benefits, The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) have implemented two PBC pilot projects 
started in 2011 for the maintenance of a small portion of the Northern Java road network. The road agency is also 
laying the foundation for future expansion of the PBC approach after the pilot trial 
2. PBC for Roads – Challenges in Indonesia 
In order to achieve the benefits of PBC, the challenges that road agencies face around the world include the 
allocation of risks to the party that is able to manage them best. In a long-term contract such as PBC, there should be 
a “partnering” relationship between the contractor and the client. Another difficulty is the identification and clear 
definition of appropriate performance indicators. 
Opus International on behalf of The World Bank have studied the framework for introducing PBC to Indonesia [2]. 
In the beginning of their study, they identified three key items to be addressed to enable performance based contracting 
to be successfully implemented in Indonesia.  These are:  
x  Concerns about overweight vehicles (overloading) 
x  Concerns about the quality of the existing road construction  
x  The ability of the Ministry of Finance to enter into a multi-year maintenance contract 
There were other issues but can be considered secondary to the above three items. Ensueing The World Bank 
recommendations, the Ministry of Public Works have implemented two PBC pilot projects in 2011, the Pantura 
Section Demak-Trengguli (7.68 kilometers) in Central Java Province and Section Ciasem-Pamanukan (18.5 
kilometers) in West Java Province. Both sections are categorized as national roads. The contract duration for both 
projects is four years. 
Those pilot projects were then evaluated in Wirahadikusumah et al. [3]. There were challenges that can be learned 
for the next pilots. This study focused on identifying the driving factors to achieve higher benefits and/or lower costs 
(“value-for-money”) in such projects.  Indonesian contractors and clients agreed that PBC is logical as a form of 
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alternative contract type which may deliver additional benefit/value (which may be followed by cost reduction) 
compared to the traditional type of contract currently in used in the delivery of national roads. From literatures, twenty 
driving factors for PBC implementation were been identified. These were confirmed in the case study, and two 
additional drivers were also identified. The lessons learned from the two pilot projects of PBC on Indonesian roads 
were mainly the importance for all parties involved to be open to the new rules of contract and to convince themselves 
about the potential increased benefits of the use of PBC. 
Based on the study, four driving factors are main prerequisite, i.e., “Implementation of output specification,” 
“Implementation of clear and measurable outcome,” “Budget availability,” and “Implementation of performance 
specification. All four factors should be stated clearly within the PBC’s clauses. Respondents believed that if the 
government will extensively implement PBC nation-wide, they should put more serious efforts to promote and 
socialize this new scheme to all stakeholders including convincing internal government key personnel in the Ministry 
of Public Works, in the Ministry of Finance, and the legislative.  
Since then, the MPW have convinced the Ministry of Finance to agree on allocating four more PBC projects with 
7 (seven) year contract duration. These are: 
x Section Semarang-Bawen, West Java (22 kilometers), contract period: 2012-2018 
x Section Bojonegoro-Padangan, East Java (11 kilometers), contract period: 2012-2018 
x Section Padangan-Ngawi, East Java (10.70 kilometers), contract period: 2012-2018 
x Section Sei Hanyu-Tb. Lahung, Central Kalimantan (50.60 kilometers), contract period: 2013-2020 
While all pilots are situated in Java, the latter section is located in Kalimantan, an island not in Java. This decision 
to try a project out of Java is part of MPW’s effort to test the scheme on the stakeholders far from the nation capital. 
The vast geographic region of Indonesia, consists of thousands of islands, poses a unique challenge for the traditionally 
central-based road national asset management. Furthermore, the capacity of local construction industry is lacking. 
Lessons learned from such pilot project are highly anticipated.  Next, the national road agency of MPW is targeting 
to execute longer-term contract duration to ten years for typical PBC for national road maintenance. The first two 
pilots in 2011 have been evaluated by the National Audit Board (i.e., BPK-RI). While they approve and are supportive 
of PBC trials, their recommendations include to temporarily reschedule future pilots in accordance with the 
requirement for MPW to put together more comprehensive legal frameworks to ensure compliance with the 
regulations. 
3. PBC for Roads – Experiences of Australia 
In the 1990’s, the New South Wales (NSW) Government started to experiment with performance based 
maintenance contracting (PBMC), which was designed to turn the control and responsibility of road transport 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and capital improvements over to private contractors [4,5]. PBMC (also referred to as 
performance based contract (PBC) in Australia) [6] combines “pure and hybrid” types of performance based contract 
to manage all categories of urban and rural road maintenance projects. The Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) began 
by undertaking pilot studies of two short-term contracts in western Sydney, each of 100 kilometres (kms) that primarily 
focused on the determination and differences in costs, quality, and response time between the private contractor and 
RTA workforce [1,7]. Ref [4] asserted that the NSW pilot studies were ‘innovative’, allowing private contractors and 
the RTA workforce to acquire the necessary skills and understanding of PBC associated risks [8]. It was a process that 
led to the carrying out of detailed analyses of road networks based on features and conditions of the roads, data 
collation of historical work and cost, definitions and methodologies for performance measurement and reporting of 
maintenance and service management [4,9]. Ref [10] stated that road transport performance measurements tend to 
originate for a number of reasons that can be to measure the current and future conditions of road infrastructure, as 
well as providing an evaluation of the road authority efficiency with respect to the services provided, productivity, 
environment protection, and cost effectiveness of those programs.  
Resulting from the success of the NSW pilot studies that generated overall cost savings of 16 per cent and 
productivity increases of 22 per cent, other Australian states adopted the use of performance based contract to maintain 
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and repair both urban and rural networks [11]. Subsequently, the NSW Government in 1995 tendered its first full PBC 
covering 450 kms of urban roads in Sydney [6,5], which achieved a 25 per cent lower bid price. However, in 1999 the 
NSW Government commenced investigations and inquiries into outsourcing and competitive tendering of road 
maintenance contracts, as the costs savings were in a deteriorating state affecting a number of PBC outsourced projects 
that were then being undertaken in the state. According to [6], the State Development Committee was established with 
terms of reference (ToR) to investigate the role of competitive tendering as a means to reduce the State’s road 
maintenance bill. In the course of the investigations, the NSW government changed the ToR and decided to keep road 
maintenance as the sole responsibility of RTA, but introduced sweeping changes that introduced a series of 
benchmarks for future road maintenance project performance. The government’s decision was attributed mainly to 
the fear of job losses in rural and community regions. In spite of the government’s decision to halt contracting 
arrangements with private contractors, NSW actually renominated one contract in Sydney’s north east sector that had 
been in operation for over 10 years and was worth $35 million, as performance ‘specified’ maintenance contract 
(PSMC) [6].  
In other Australian jurisdictions, notably Western Australia (WA) and Victoria, outsourcing of road maintenance 
contracts has operated very successfully. WA and Tasmania adopted the whole-of state model (long-term PBC) that 
comprised urban and rural road networks, and Tasmania was the first state in Australia to introduce a long-term PBC 
[4].  In Victoria, the State road provider, VicRoads adopted a mix of in-house maintenance provider that competes 
alongside the private contractor for road maintenance services [6]. The in-house capability is used as a benchmark to 
compare the private contractor’s performance and means of incorporating performance maintenance skills lacked in-
house and outsourcing delivery modes. The story is different in WA that embraced full PBC by entering into 8 
performance based contracts with 10 years duration, which includes maintenance and rehabilitation services of 
national highways, state road networks, and local roads. Six contracts were pure PBC, while the other two are hybrids 
[12]. The pure PBC road lengths were 1,560 km to 4,280, while the hybrids were of shorter contracts, covering 315 
km to 375 km with the imposition of an oversight authority as superintendent. The superintendent is responsible for 
identifying defects in works performed by the private contractor with the power to issue a rework order [13]. The 
short-term drivers of the PBCs described the extent of allowable road defects and response time [12]. The long-term 
drivers are set of conditions and attributes within the contract terms and conditions for the road user costs (roughness, 
surface texture, surface skid resistance and rutting) safety, and pavement life. 
The difference between WA scope of work for pure PBC and [10] description ignores the cost efficiency associated 
with performance based contracts and serviceability of the roads. The scope of works of pure PBCs in WA was as 
follows: Routine and periodic maintenance; Reconstruction and rehabilitation; Emergency response; Customer 
relations; Collection and maintenance of asset inventory data. 
In WA, these contracts (pure and hybrids) were awarded on the assumption of best value for money that attracted 
capable bidders on the basis of five step procurement approach such as: Pre-qualification of suitable companies based 
on submission and expression of interests; Maintenance contract request for proposals; Identification of the preferred 
bidder; Due diligence and contract negotiations; Contract award and possession of site. 
Australia uses the Quality-Based Selection (QBS) method to select a winning tender bid, which takes into 
consideration both quality and price. The bid is separately evaluated against these two criteria and scored with weights 
applied to each (80:20, 60:40, etc.) and the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest combined score. Weights, 
scores, criteria, and importance of their attributions to the bid are determined by the contracting agency [4,9]. The 
benefits that arise from QBS method of selection tend to encourage and attract mostly highly experienced contractors 
to tender for the contract, and in in turn, eliminate unqualified and inexperienced contractors from participating.  
Drawing from the WA experience, risks allocated to the private sector included cost variations due to latent road 
conditions, salinity and rising water table, traffic volumes, axle loadings, selection of treatments, and the cost of any 
re-work required to meet agreed standards. PBC is a shift from a work output-driven vehicle to a performance 
specification driven type of arrangement that allocates and transfers the risk exposure associated with road 
maintenance from government agencies (road authority) to the private contractor. In NSW, the fundamental premise 
of the first PBC by RTA was that the contractor achieved specified road condition standards over the contract term, 
design work programs, funding, and delivered ‘whatever works’ required to achieve the stated standards [14]. It should 
be noted that in certain circumstances, it is highly desirable that the vesting of maintenance works remains with the 
government road authorities, for example, hybrid contracts or full maintenance contracts where natural disaster occurs 
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and might prove difficult for the private contractor to achieve the desired outcome [6]. 
Various mixed procurement options have been adopted by each state in Australia that combine “pure and hybrid” 
performance based type contracts. Both Tasmania and WA have opted for long-term contract arrangements using 
PBC, the Victorian government has adopted a partial outsourcing model that allows an in-house maintenance provider 
to work alongside the private contractor for road maintenance services [6]. In NSW, the use of PBC has been for the 
time being reduced, or temporarily halted for contracting arrangements. There is one contract in operation for over 10 
years now known as the performance specified maintenance contract (PBMC) worth $35 million and operating 
successfully in the Sydney North East Sector [6].  
Whilst road maintenance contracting in Australia has produced several successful project outcomes, it has also at 
times been somewhat inconsistent, because of the circumstance and motives behind its introduction, which are 
primarily directed towards cost reductions and improvements of allocated efficiencies. The process has neither 
achieved the success expected or delivered the desired outcome intended, because the rationale for adopting certain 
types of procurement arrangements are either not well defined as they have been driven by various state governments’ 
financial or political necessity to reduce road maintenance costs. This public policy driver, even when attributed with 
best value for money in terms of cost savings, often tends to lack the wider support deserved and this has led [6] to 
state that some of the performance based contracts are ‘wounded back in Australia’. Road maintenance outsourcing, 
as with any other form of partnership between the public and private sectors, is important and designed to provide 
best value for money as the core element in the arrangement. However, the transfer of all risks associated with road 
maintenance to the private contractor may in the end be impossible or inappropriate, and can actually lead to poor 
outcomes, or dampen the appetite and envisaged competition for outsourcing maintenance contracts; it may even 
reduce incentives on the entities to be proactive and accountable. A more effective way to manage risk is to identify 
the nature of risks and apportion each to the entity best equipped to manage those risks effectively [6,15]. For example, 
the Tasmanian government recognized the importance of collaborative effort as risk and key to PBC success that 
transcends above any other criteria in performance based contracts with the private contractor [4,9]. 
4. The Way Forward for Indonesia 
Learning from Australia’s experiences, while the public seek the best value for money, but transferring all or most 
risks to the private contractor may be impossible or inappropriate. This is more so in the case of Indonesia. 
Construction firms do not have the capacity (both technical and financial) to retain high risks; furthermore, the 
uncertainties in Indonesian context is greater, due to high political influence in the local and national levels, and weak 
law enforcement. Thus, there should be more effective way to manage risk.  
Other than risk management, following are the more detailed challenges. In the early stage, it was considered that 
the MOF was unlikely to approve funding of a multi-year maintenance contract (PBC or otherwise) until they could 
be convinced of the merits. Recently, this issue has been progressing, however, there are numerous detailed matters 
to be settled as listed in Table 1.  Ref [2] identified these important items to be addressed to enable PBC to be 
successfully implemented in the specific context of Indonesia. After having experiences of completing trials on two 
sections, and continuing with four more on-going projects, the most recent state of those issues were explored and 
described. Recommendations for future PBC deployment nation-wide should be based on more research associated 
with risk allocation. This will include investigation of standard conditions of contract. Implications of the contract 
clauses for the risk management strategy to be adopted by contractors. Based on the nature of risks, some are best 
managed by the project owner. Also, it is very important that all parties involved to be open to the new rules of contract 
and to convince themselves about the potential increased benefits of the use of PBC. More comprehensive efforts to 
promote and socialize this new scheme to all stakeholders including convincing internal government key personnel in 
the Ministry of Public Works, in the Ministry of Finance, and the legislative. 
Table 1. PBC issues to be settled 
Identified issues needed to 
be settled 
Current state 
1. Policy issues  
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Identified issues needed to 
be settled 
Current state 
1.a. Utility services Utility operators generally have a right to install their assets within the road reserve, however, there is 
no control over the quality of reinstatement. 
Permen PU 20/2010 ensures that such activity can only proceed with DGH authorization. 
1.b. Limited access regulations A policy with regard to the prevention of access to the road network is still not available. Such a 
policy requires legislative changes to enable for the removal of illegal roadside activities. 
1.c. Bond requirements Current bond provision for construction works is not suitable for the PBC maintenance contract, 
wherein the 4 or 7 years of maintenance activities are equivalent to a performance bond. 
1.d Cost escalation While BPS (Statistics Board) produces a cost escalation index, it does not appropriately reflect the 
inputs to the contract (particularly the longer term maintenance component) 
1.e. Interest for late payment by 
client 
There are no penalties for late payment from the client. The contractor needs surety of payment; 
international standard practice is that the interest rate is reviewed throughout the contract period and 
set at a percentage above the contractors’ rate of borrowing. 
1.f. Reporting standards for 
maintenance data 
As a national system for the storage of maintenance data does not exist. Such format can be supplied 
to PBC contractors and DGH can start collecting and storing the maintenance data. 
1.g. Management systems for 
roadside furniture 
Ministry of Communication (DepHub) is the party, not DPW, that manages the roadside furniture. 
These assets are not included in the PBC contracts, while they are an integral part of the networks. 
2. Legislative changes required 
2.a. Financial arrangements for 
multi-year maintenance 
contracts 
MOF have approved several 4 and 7 years PBC contracts. A 10-year contract is now in discussion. In 
the long-term, approval from the legislation enabling a certain percentage of the annual road budget 
to be committed for PBC road maintenance. 
2.b. Control of overloaded 
vehicles 
This is a very complex issue, not just about enforcing weigh bridge stations and fining truckers. The 
average of 50% overload is a classic problem, trade-off between costs of trucking and road 
maintenance costs. 
3. Contractual issues  
3.a. Benchmark data collection The collection of a comprehensive set of data is necessary to: establish a benchmark of the current 
condition,  develop/confirm key performance measures, reduce the risks to contractors and enable 
equitable risk sharing 
3.b. Proposed contract 
organizational structure 
Management board members should be a senior staff from each organisation, and not those involved 
in the operational delivery of the contract.  Operational staff may attend at times to advise the board, 
but they have no voting rights. Longer term, once all parties are comfortable with the way the PBC 
operates, introduction of a structure without a management board could be considered. 
3.c. Selection of the PBC 
consultant 
We consider that the PBC consultant should be engaged early in the next phase of the contract – 
namely to assist in document development, development of key performance measures and the like.  
In this way, the PBC consultant will be able to assimilate the ideals of the contract and more 
importantly will have buy-in to the contract that they will be required to supervise. 
3.d. Tendering processes The two stage tender approach will ensure only capable tenderers’ are considered for the final tender 
stage.  Furthermore, it will limit tendering cost for those tenderers’ who do not have a real chance of 
submitting a successful tender. 
3.e. 
Initial betterment and 
capacity improvement 
works 
Given that some of the road network is in a poor condition, an initial injection of capital to raise the 
standard of the assets to an acceptable level is considered appropriate.  In addition to betterment type 
works, it is appropriate to include capacity improvement works into the contract such that a multi-
year maintenance period is included. 
However, in order to maintain the focus on the maintenance activities, it is essential that the 
construction type activities (capacity improvements and betterments) do not dominate the value of the 
contract.  To this end, an upper limit of 50% of the total contract price should be assigned to 
construction type activities. 
It would also be appropriate to include into the contract betterment works that are to be completed up 
to 12 months before the end of the contract period.  In this way, there would be an implicit 12 month 
maintenance period on any works completed. 
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Identified issues needed to 
be settled 
Current state 
3.f. 
Exclusion of successful 
contractor from future 
projects 
In order to prevent the situation wherein the contractor who wins the initial pilot becomes dominant 
(through having the only experience), the contract documentation for the pilot trial should include 
wording to the effect that “The DGH reserves the right (at their sole discretion) to exclude the 
successful contractor from other PBC contracts during the term of the contract”. 
Similarly, it would be prudent that in future implementations, where more than one contract is let in a 
year, a condition of only being able to win one package should be imposed.  This condition would be 
revisited once a number of contractors have had a chance to gain experience in the PBC arena and a 
stable situation exists with open competition. 
4. Key performance measures 
The development of KPMs will be required early in the contract document development process.  The 
actual KPM development should be based on the condition data obtained from the Benchmark survey 
5. 
Industry training and 
knowledge transfer needs 
Industry training is likely to be required to ensure both the competitive nature of the tendering process 
and for the ultimate success of the pilot trial.  While the World Bank 3-day training course on PBC as 
produced by Carl Bro will cover the issues around the PBC itself, it is considered that specific 
training will be required on the following aspects: 
6. Construction industry 
Consider outsourcing of routine maintenance contracts on an “input” or “output” basis to give 
industry more maintenance contracting experience 
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